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Abstract 
This paper shows the results of experiments where subjects play 
the Schelling's spatial proximity model (1969, 1971a). Two types of 
experiments  are  conducted;  one  in  which  choices  are  made 
sequentially, and a variation of the first where the decision-making 
is  simultaneous.  The  results  of  the  sequential  experiments  are 
identical to Schelling's prediction: subjects finish in a segregated 
equilibrium. Likewise, in the variant of the simultaneous decision 
experiment  the  same  result  is  reached:  segregation.  Subjects’ 
heterogeneity generates a series of focal points in the first round. 
In  order  to  locate  themselves,  subjects  use  these  focal  points 
immediately, and as a result, the segregation takes place again. 
Furthermore,  simultaneous  experiments  with  commuting  costs 
allow us to conclude that introducing positive moving costs does 
not affect segregation. 
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1.Introduction 
Schelling’s model (1969, 1971a) represents a paradigm inside the theory: 
from a theoretical point of view it is a simple model, laconic in hypothesis 
and with very powerful results. In addition, it is an empirically relevant 
model since it offers a clear explanation of the segregation phenomenon; 
a problem that has worried planners since the second half of the twentieth 
century
i. Moreover, segregation has turned out to be one of the most 
important topics in the socio-political and public economic debate (The 
Economist, 2001). 
In general, there are two basic variants of Schelling's "model of spatial 
proximity"
ii. The first version is a one-dimensional model and is introduced 
in Schelling (1969). In Schelling (1971a), a two-dimensional version is 
presented, which also appears later in Schelling (1971b, 1978). This work 
experimentally analyzes the one-dimensional model. 
In the one-dimensional version of Schelling's spatial proximity model 
(1969, 1971a) a society is modeled through a sequence of individuals 
distributed along a line
iii. Two types of individuals form the society: whites 
and blacks. The adjacent neighbors to the left and right-hand side define 
the neighborhood of each individual
iv. The individuals who compose this 
society are assumed to be utility maximizers, that is to say, they look for 
their best interest. The preferences of an agent are marked by his level of 
tolerance regarding the number of neighbors equal to him. For example, a 
“slightly” tolerant agent would be one who demands that all his neighbors   3 
next to him are of his same type, while a "moderately” tolerant agent would 
accept that half of his neighbors were like him
v.  
In short, a striking result of Schelling’s model is that even when beginning 
from a society where individuals are moderately tolerant, regarding the 
number of neighbors of their same type (as defined above), the sum of 
individual options generates a totally segregated community. Figure 1 
illustrates how starting from a situation of complete social integration 
(circle a), a completely segregated society (circle b) is reached after 
individuals are allowed to move.  
Figure 1: 
This equilibrium solution is a very powerful result since it seems to suggest 
that it is impossible to do anything to counteract segregation because it is 
simply the equilibrium configuration. This result is surprising and has 
generated a vast amount of literature from a wide range of scientific 
disciplines. Why does this occur? Schelling assumes that agents act 
myopically and sequentially. According to these assumptions, when an 
agent moves, it is always towards a neighborhood with a higher 
percentage of members from his own group than in the neighborhood he 
currently occupies. Further, notice that blocks of homogeneous agents (i.e. 
groups of agents such that boundary homogenous agents may be defined) 
will always have interiors where no agents wish to move. When agents 
move beyond the boundary of a block, this automatically increases the 
number of spaces where they will be content to be completely segregated. 
Together, these features mean that individual moves in the Schelling   4 
model typically increase the level of segregation and that some increases 
in segregation increase the size of stable segregated groups with 
complete segregation occurring asymptotically. Schelling’s findings turn 
out to be relatively general and have been theoretically formalized by 
Granovetter and Soong (1988) and Young (1988). Granovetter and Soong 
(1988) showed that Schelling’s segregation model can be expressed in 
terms of a system of two coupled difference equations. Likewise, Young 
(1998) is noteworthy in recasting Schelling’s work in the context of 
evolutionary game theory. In fact, he was the first to point out that 
techniques developed in evolutionary game theory, and in particular the 
concept of stochastic stability introduced by Foster and Young (1990), are 
useful for analyzing Schelling’s spatial proximity model. Young (1998, 
2001) presents a simple variation of Schelling’s one-dimensional model, 
showing that segregation tends to occur in the long term even if any agent 
does not prefer a segregated neighborhood. In Young’s one-dimensional 
variant of the Schelling model (1998), he considers that the agents 
exchange their positions for compensation payments and also that these 
agents can be wrong. The result is that segregation is the only viable long-
term outcome of the dynamics of best response, as long as the 
preferences of the players on the composition of their neighborhood are 
biased in favor of their own kind. Pancs and Vriend (2007) obtained similar 
results, showing that segregation is the only possible long-term outcome 
when agents with a preference for 50-50 neighborhoods play their best 
response to the neighborhood's racial composition in a circularly   5 
connected society (a ring). The authors examine the robustness of 
Schelling’s model, focusing on a particular driving force: individual 
preferences. They also show that even if all individual agents have a strict 
preference for perfect integration, best response dynamics can lead to 
segregation. This raises some doubts about the ability of public policies to 
achieve integration by promoting openness and tolerance for diversity. In a 
related work, Mobius (2000) shows how random field methods may be 
applied to a Schelling-type model in ways that allow for richer 
neighborhood configurations than have previously been studied. This work 
suggests that statistical mechanics methods may prove to be useful in the 
modeling of segregation dynamics. 
Nevertheless, the original version of Schelling’s model has some particular 
features. One of the most important of these is the fact that subjects move 
sequentially in order to reach the equilibrium outcome. All the individuals 
who are not in a situation beyond their threshold of tolerance are 
organized to carry out their displacement in the society. That is, first an 
individual decides if he wants to move or not, then the following one 
decides, and so on until the last one.  
From a theoretical point of view, sequentiality is not trivial. This is due to 
the fact that in the sequential model the k-th subject already views the first 
k-1 decisions as a given and can only decide on the remaining N-k. Thus, 
in the sequential model every subject has different information, which 
depends on the moment when the individual decides. In a simultaneous 
model, however, all the subjects would decide on the N possible positions   6 
simultaneously and the amount of information available to each subject 
would be identical
vi.  
The aim of this work is to experimentally test Schelling’s model by having 
the subjects play in both a sequential and a simultaneous way.
vii This is 
the first work using a laboratory experiment of Schelling’s model in which 
individuals choose simultaneously
viii.  
In order to conduct the experiments, Schelling’s model is first designed in 
its original setting (where subjects make decisions sequentially). A 
modification is then proposed in which the subjects make decisions 
simultaneously. The experimental results of Schelling’s model when 
subjects decide sequentially coincide with the theoretical prediction of 
Schelling’s model: subjects end up in equilibrium with total segregation in 
a single round. Surprisingly, in the experiment using Schelling’s model 
where individuals decide simultaneously, we obtain the total segregation 
outcome as well. In this second case, subjects’ heterogeneity generates a 
series of focal points in the first round, that are used by the subjects to 
locate themselves and, as a result, total segregation emerges again
ix.  
The rest of the work is structured as follows: the second section shows 
Schelling’s standard model and its equilibrium prediction. Also we 
introduce a variation of Schelling’s model in which subjects make the 
decisions simultaneously. The third section describes the design of the 
experiments and how they are performed. The fourth section analyzes the 
results of the basic experiment. Section fifth shows a variation and the 
sixth discusses policy implications. The last section concludes.   7 
2. Schelling's spatial proximity model. 
2.1. Schelling’s sequential model. 
In order to represent Schelling’s sequential model we start from a circle in 
which we distribute N subjects of two clearly differentiated types (whites 
and reds)
x. The neighborhood of each subject is defined as well as the 
adjacent neighbors to the left and the right, that is to say, every individual 
has two neighbors; the first one to his left and the second one to his right. 
In this way, the number of neighborhoods in the circle is equal to the 
number of individuals that compose it, N. The model is defined by the 
following properties: first, subjects are assumed to have a utility function 
according to which they reach happiness when they have at least a 
neighbor of their same type
xi; second, subjects move sequentially and 
without cost (the first one decides first, then the following one decides, and 
so on to the N-th agent
xii).  
Though mobility costs do not exist, Schelling imposes that subjects move 
to the closest place that satisfies their neighbor demand, bearing in mind 
that moving to the nearest place means being located in the closest 
space. A space is the distance between two persons. With these minimal 
requirements the society will change from a situation of complete social 
integration (Figure 1, circle a) to a situation of absolute segregation (Figure 
1, circle b). 
How is total segregation reached? Figure 2 illustrates the movements for a 
society of 8 individuals, (N=8).  
Figure 2:   8 
In the initial situation (Figure 1, circle a), subjects are completely unhappy 
given that they do not have any neighbor of their same type. Let's suppose 
that the white player on the top left side is the first one to make a decision 
(this player will be called 1). Given that subject 1 is not happy, he moves to 
the closest place where he is happy. As a consequence, subject 2 is now 
happy (and so is subject 8) and therefore does not move. Subject 3 is also 
happy (since subject 1 has moved next to him). Nevertheless, subject 4 
continues being an unhappy person since he still does not have any 
neighbors of his type. Therefore subject 4 moves next to subject 6. This 
makes both subject 6 (who is of his same color) and subject 5 (who is 
located next to subject 3) happy. Finally, subject 7, who is not happy, 
moves next to 2 and by doing so complete segregation is reached (see 
Figure 2, circle 4). 
In short, given the minimal requirements regarding the preferences of the 
model, full segregation is achieved with only three movements. This is the 
"magic" of Schelling’s model. Nevertheless, the sequential movement 
makes everything very simple: when the players make decisions they 
already know what has happened, specifically they know that the previous 
subjects cannot move anymore, therefore no risk is involved. For example, 
when subject 4 moves he knows that neither subject 5 nor subject 6 are 
going to move, (that is, they will not harm him afterwards).  
2.2 Schelling’s simultaneous model. 
To describe Schelling’s simultaneous model, we assume, as in the 
previous case, that the society is comprised of N subjects of two different   9 
types distributed along a circle. We define the neighborhood for each one 
of them in the same way we did in the previous model. In this case the 
model is characterized by the following properties: first, we continue 
assuming that subjects have a utility function according to which they 
reach happiness when they have at least a neighbor of their same type; 
second, subjects move without costs. In this case, however, all subjects 
decide whether to move or not at the same time, that is to say, it is a 
simultaneous decision. Finally, subjects can move to any place they wish 
along the circle since their movement is not restricted to the most nearby 
place.  
The theoretical model to approach this problem would be a game in a 
strategic form with N players. Every player would have N-1 pure 
strategies, which correspond to moving to each of the spaces that the N 
players form along the circle (these are N-2 strategies) or remaining still. 
Therefore, in the case of 8 players we would have the strategy of jumping 
clockwise into the second space, the third space and so on up to the sixth 
space. Notice that to move either to the first or seventh space is to remain 
still. This finite game has, at least, an equilibrium in mixed strategies but in 
addition, multiple equilibria in pure strategies. With these requirements, the 
simultaneous model should be completely different from the sequential 
model. Nevertheless, the equilibrium outcome is also complete 
segregation, but with two rounds. 
More precisely, there are two possible pure equilibria configurations: red-
red-red-red-white-white-white-white, (RRRRWWWW) or red-red-white-  10 
white-red-red-white-white, (denoted by RRWWRRWW). The first 
configuration above may arise from movements by the even numbers (red 
subjects) together to a common place (independently of the odd numbers 
or white subjects) or the opposite: joint movement of the odd numbers to 
the same place. The second configuration arises after movements by two 
players to the same place and another two players (of the same type) to 
any other non-clustered space. Notice that none of the players has an 
incentive to change their strategy in either configuration since they are 
already happy. 
So far, the number of pure strategy equilibria is a large number. Actually it 
is an exponential number with respect to the size of the game. Hence, the 
possibility of coordination at any pure equilibrium becomes quite small. 
Consequently, we will expect a non-pure equilibrium configuration as a 
result of the first round of the simultaneous game, that is, the most 
probable configuration is a society with some clusters, but not a happy 
society. 
In fact, the later configurations are also the consequence of mixed strategy 
equilibria where subjects play a uniform mixed strategy given that 
information is symmetric but imperfect. Actually, any configuration could 
be the realization of the uniform mixed strategy. Hernández and Von 
Stengel (2009) fully characterize the equilibrium set (pure, mixed and 
correlated) of this “geographical coordination game”. Nevertheless, we do 
not have the same set of equilibria after the first round. Actually, given a 
new non-symmetric configuration, the number of pure equilibria   11 
decreases, making it easy for players to find a device to coordinate their 
actions. 
To explain the equilibrium outcome, let us suppose that we are in a 
situation like the one depicted in the second circle of Figure 2 in which 
individual number 4 is unhappy, as well as individuals 5, 6 and 7. We are 
going to focus only on the movement of players 4 and 6
xiii. In this 
simultaneous game, player 4 does not know a priori if player 6 will be 
waiting for him when he arrives. If he decides to move next to him
xiv, 
therefore, subject 4 will probably decide to move to the least uncertain 
place, i.e. he would go to the "group of 2-8". The reason is simple: group 
2-8 is more certain than subject 6. There are many reasons why going to 
the big group is better. First, both subject 2 and 8 are happy next to each 
other and therefore will not move. Second, subject 4 could "anticipate" that 
subject 6 might be thinking the same thing he is, that is, subject 6 is 
thinking about moving to the big group and will not be in his position if 
subject 4 chooses to move to his side. Figure 3 represents the situation in 
which only subjects 4 and 6 move and where a situation of absolute 
segregation is reached (Figure 3, circle 2). 
Figure 3: 
In a game with these characteristics, subjects can often coordinate their 
intentions or expectations with others, as each one knows that the other is 
trying to do the same thing he is doing. Most of the situations provide 
agents with some hints for coordination. These hints are focal points about 
what others might expect from them
xv. It is evident that if there is no   12 
convergence, the process of prediction and interaction turns out to be 
unsuccessful. The key is that when individuals make their decisions, they 
try to accomplish a common task, not an individual one
xvi. Each individual 
reduces his search space by spontaneously using the hints that have the 
highest probability of making both of their expectations convergent; what 
Binmore and Samuelson (2006) call the exploitation of framing information 
(use contextual information). 
Finding the hint, or rather searching for this key, involves finding some 
code that is mutually recognized by all subjects as the key. This search 
may depend on precedents, accidental agreements, symmetry, geometric 
configuration, etc. And it is in this way that these keys turn out to be focal 
points of the game (Schelling, 1960). In sum, it seems that focal points are 
only needed for the subjects of the simultaneous game in order to 
generate the full segregation obtained in the sequential model. 
   13 
3. Design and implementation of the experiment. 
The experiment was conducted using an instructions booklet (set) to 
explain the rules of the game and how subjects could obtain maximum 
happiness (see a copy of the instructions in the Appendix). In order to 
ensure that each of the subjects in the experiments had a preference 
regarding the composition of their neighborhood by which they could 
achieve happiness, they were paid two euros if at least one of their 
adjacent neighbors (either to the left or to the right) was of their same type 
by the end of the experiment. If none of the adjacent neighbors were of 
their same type, the subjects received zero euros (the individual was 
unhappy). In both the sequential and the simultaneous versions of the 
game, the initial configuration was that of maximum unhappiness for all 
the subjects comprising the society (Figure 1a). Under this initial 
framework, no one would obtain payment. The only way for subjects to 
receive payment was for them to move in such a manner as to reach 
maximum happiness. For the sake of simplicity, 8 subjects were used in all 
the cases. 
The 8 subjects were placed in two rows of 4 subjects each.
xvii The subjects 
were given a white or a red scarf to identify them as a white typed or a red 
typed subject. The subjects were told to form a circle between both rows 
and asked to identify the color of the scarves of their adjacent neighbors. 
This initial position allowed each subject to verify that his neighbors were 
different from him, and therefore all the subjects were unhappy.    14 
During the sequential game, subjects had to wait their turn to decide if 
they were going to move or not (observing what had happened). In the 
simultaneous game, however, all the subjects made their decisions 
simultaneously (without knowing the decisions made by the others). The 
subjects were given a control sheet to inform them about their position and 
the position of the other players (see an example in Figure 9 of the 
Appendix). The experiment was run only once (a one-shot game). 
The experiments were conducted at the Universidad Pública de Navarra 
(in Pamplona) and at the Universitat de València as follows: 
•  Pamplona: 56 subjects were distributed in sequential models (2 
groups of 8 subjects) and in simultaneous models (5 groups of 8 
subjects)  
•  Valencia: 40 subjects were distributed in sequential models (2 
groups of 8 subjects) and in simultaneous models (3 groups of 8 
subjects). 
The experiments were run at both universities following a regular class 
with students who volunteered to participate. Students or subjects were 
not recruited specifically for the experiment. The task did not last more 
than 10 minutes and all the subjects earned 2 euros (on average and in 
mode since all they won, see Tables 1 and 2). The subjects did not receive 
a show-up fee.  
   15 
4. Results 
4.1 Results of the sequential games 
Three out of four of the sequential games worked exactly as the theory 
predicts. That is to say, subject 1 (who was not happy) moved next to 
subject 3, making subjects 2, 3 and 8 happy. Subject 4 (who was not 
happy either) then moved next to subject 6, making subjects 5 and 6 
happy. Finally, subject 7 (who was not happy yet) had no other choice but 
to move next to subject 1 (see Figure 2). Complete segregation was 
reached as a consequence of the movements of subjects 1, 4 and 7. 
Table 1: 
Nevertheless, an interesting variation occurred for one of the groups 
(group A2 of Pamplona, see Figure 4). In this group, in spite of being in a 
situation in which he was not happy, subject 1 realized (technically “he 
anticipated") that he could stay still and allow the others to solve the 
situation later. In other words, subject 1 realized that the other players 
would have no other choice but to move in order to be happy and that he 
would end up being happy without having to move. Subject 2, who was not 
happy given that subject 1 had not moved, fulfilled subject 1’s expectation 
and moved next to subject 4. Thus, he made subjects 1, 3 and 4 happy. 
As in the previous case, three players moved in the end (subjects 2, 5 and 
8, see Figure 4), giving rise to a situation of complete segregation of the 
society where all subjects are happy. 
Result 1: The players of Schelling’s sequential model reach the equilibrium 
of complete segregation with the three movements foreseen in the theory.   16 
Figure 4: 
4.2 Results of the simultaneous games 
A priori, and as we anticipated previously, we should expect different 
results for the simultaneous game, with regard to the sequential game, 
mainly for two reasons:  
1.  First, all the subjects in the simultaneous game possess the same 
information at all times, while in the sequential games we find that 
subjects have more past information after each decision (since they 
already know the movements that have happened) and less future 
information (since fewer movements are left to be solved). 
Nevertheless, in the simultaneous game all the subjects decide at 
the same time for each round without knowing the decisions of any 
of the other subjects as there is no order for decision making. 
2.  Second, the results in the simultaneous game are only probable 
(not assured). In other words, a subject can decide to move into a 
position but when he arrives there, the subjects he expected to find 
are no longer there because the other subjects have decided to 
move as well. 
Therefore, how should subjects play in this game? The optimal way of 
playing in the simultaneous game is the following:  
-  First, every subject generates his own distribution of types of 
players in which he anticipates who is going to move and 
who will remain still.    17 
-  Second, given this expectation, the subject will decide which 
is his best response, i.e. he will move to the most convenient 
place for him based on what he anticipates that the other 
subjects will do. 
As suggested by the literature on "levels of reasoning" (Nagel 1995, Bosch 
et al. 2002) one can expect to find variety in the best responses, that is, 
we can find subjects that (optimally) do not move, move a little or move a 
lot. Therefore, given the initial situation of white-red-white-red-white-red-
white-red and the heterogeneity of types
xviii, it is very probable that at least 
two focal points of size 2 would appear: white-white or red-red. 
Table 2 shows the number of subjects that moved in every round and the 
number of happy subjects when each of the rounds was finished. Figures 
5, 6, 7 and 8 show the results for the eight simultaneous games: Figure 5 
shows the case for two of them (S1 and S3), Figure 6 and Figure 7 show 
how another two games were played (S2 and S7, respectively), Figure 8 
shows how game S6 was played, and Figure 9 shows game S5. Notice 
that two of the eight games are missing.  
Table 2: 
In both Pamplona (group S4) and Valencia (group S8), we found that 
Schelling’s simultaneous game was played in such a way that maximum 
segregation distribution was reached in just one round. The game went 
from Figure 1a to 1b without intermediate steps. A possible explanation for 
the results of these two games is that all the subjects made an accurate 
prediction and reached equilibrium in one movement. The alternative   18 
explanation is that it occurred accidentally. This is not surprising since 
according to the theory, this result is relatively probable (20%). 
The rest of Schelling’s simultaneous games are depicted in the 4 figures 
mentioned above. In four of them, the two most a priori expected focal 
points were created (white-white and red-red): in two of them the focal 
points turned out to be located next to each other (Figure 5).  In the other 






Regarding the generation of the focal points, there are 4 games (S1, S3, 
S2 and S7, Figures 5, 6 and 7) in which 2 focal points arise during the first 
round (close or distant). During the first round of one of the games (S6, 
Figure 8), a distribution was reached with two focal points comprised of 
three subjects of every type (white-white-white and red-red-red) and only 
two individuals, one of each type, were unhappy after making their 
decision.  
Finally, almost perfect segregation was obtained after the first round in one 
game (S5, Figure 9): only one subject remained outside his desired 
neighborhood. 
It is interesting to highlight that maximum segregation distribution was 
reached in all the cases; after only one round in two cases and after the   19 
second round in five cases. Session S7 (figure 7) provided the only 
exception: a not complete segregation outcome (WWRRWWRR). 
The simplest explanation for this surprising result (total segregation in the 
simultaneous games) can be found in the theory (see for example, Reny, 
1988, 1993 and Samuelson, 1992, among others) and is sustained upon 
two principles: rationality and common knowledge. 
•  From the rationality point of view, all the subjects that were not 
happy moved to the right place for them to reach happiness. 
•  From the common knowledge of rationality point of view, subjects 
who were happy "knew" that the neighbors who comprised the focal 
point together with them would not move because they were 
already happy and therefore did not move either
xix. In addition, 
those who moved knew they would go to spaces from which - 
assuming rationality - nobody would move. 
Therefore, a requirement as basic as rationality (with common knowledge) 
is sufficient to make the sequential movement requirement not so 
important. In other words, rationality with common knowledge generates 
the same result as that obtained from a sequential model.  
Result 2: As a consequence of rationality (together with common 
knowledge), the subjects of Schelling’s simultaneous game reached the 
completely segregated equilibrium in a maximum of two rounds. 
Result 3: The completely segregated equilibrium arises in an almost 
immediate way with or without sequential movement. 
   20 
5. Costly & simultaneous moving 
We have observed that simultaneity does not make a large difference in 
the game. However, because moving is costly in real life we cannot 
provide clear conclusions without analyzing the case of costly moving.  
We repeated the simultaneous experiment in Pamplona in March 2010 
with the only difference being that we included positive costs for 
commuting. Specifically, subjects have to pay 0.5 euros each time they 
move (recall that the maximum payoff is 2 euros).
xx Before presenting the 
results, let us discuss the expected behavior of subjects in this new set-up.  
An individual facing this situation may consider two alternatives: 
•  Moving at a cost of 0.5 euros 
•  Not moving at a cost of 0 euros 
Subjects may compute that (a) if they do not move and nobody moves, the 
actual configuration at the beginning of round 2 will be identical to round 1. 
As explained before, no new information is provided (see section 4.2, 
page 16). (b) If the subject does not move but others do, there is some 
probability that focal points will be generated. (c) If the subject does move 
and the others stay, the subject will generate a focal point for sure (and a 
potential payoff of 1.5 euros); (d) if the subject does move and the others 
move too, all configurations may arise. 
In sum, we may conclude that if any subject believes that the other players 
are not going to move, then the subject will (be more prone to) move. If the 
subject believes that the others will move, then the subject will (be more 
prone to) stay.    21 
Obviously, the higher the cost the lesser the benefits of moving and hence 
fewer people will move. However, it must be said that the new 
configuration does not actually depend on the number of subjects moving: 
a single movement may generate a nearly segregated society 
(WRWRWRWR   WWRRWRWR if subject 2 moves one place), whereas 
a movement by four subjects at the same time may generate nothing 
(WRWRWRWR   WRWRWRWR if all of them move one place) 
Once subjects move, a new configuration emerges. This is identical for 
both costly and costless moving. The configuration obtained is crucial for 
the final configuration (path dependence).  
Additionally, under positive costs, it could be the case that a player 
anticipates that others will move and thus may avoid the cost of moving. In 
a situation
xxi like WWRRWRWR, the 5
th subject may expect that the 6
th 
subject will move and therefore does not move. An identical argument is 
also valid for the 6
th player. If one of the players decides to stay, then a 
non-segregated equilibrium is achieved: WWRRWWRR. However, it is 
worth noting that this is no longer true in many other cases: in a case like 
WWWRWRRR, the final outcome is identical whether player 5 or player 6 
moves or if both move. 
In sum, given that i) the configuration in round 2 does not crucially depend 
on the number of movements; ii) strategic playing after round 2 is risky and 
iii) strategic playing does not univocally affect the final configuration, we do 
not expect dramatic changes due to the existence of positive costs.   22 
We ran 8 sessions of the simultaneous game with costs and obtained 64 
observations. As in previous cases (table 1 & 2), we show the results of 
the new sessions in Table 3: 
Table 3: 
Differences in terms of individual movement are very sound: we count a 
total sum of 33 movements throughout the game. The number of 
movements for the costless simultaneous game (Table 2) was 61.  
As expected, the numbers are very different if we only consider the 
movements made in the first round: 24 subjects moved at a cost (up to 64, 
37.5%) in sharp contrast to the costless case where 48 subjects moved 
(up to 64, 75.0%). As can be seen, the differences are significant: (t=-
4.582, p-value=0.000). Movements in the second round are also different: 
nine (14.06%) subjects moved in the costly case in contrast to the 17 
(26.56%) who moved in the costless one. Summarizing, 
Result 4: When there are positive costs, subjects are less willing to move.   
However, the real effect depends on the number of movements. We are 
much more concerned about the final configuration of the society rather 
than the number of movements. 
Costless simultaneous games achieved the complete segregated society 
(WWWWRRRR) in 6 out 8 cases and the not complete segregated society 
(WWRRWWRR) in the remaining 2.  
Recall that the costly simultaneous game provided nearly identical 
numbers: 7 out of 8 cases were WWWWRRRRR and the remaining 1 was 
WWRRWWRR.   23 
Result 5: Even with positive costs where subjects move less, the Schelling 
segregated equilibrium emerges in most of the cases.   
Hence, the introduction of costly movement does not make a great 
difference in the final configuration of the society.   24 
6. Policy implications 
The key question is how relevant these results are (result 2: equilibrium 
outcome in two steps and result 3: complete segregated configuration) to 
real life. 
It is worth noting that the original model includes two crucial assumptions:  
•  First, subjects are assumed to have a utility function according to 
their neighborhood (namely preferences for races). 
•  Second, subjects move sequentially and without cost: the first one 
decides first, then the following one decides, and so on to the N-th 
agent.  
This paper shows that a relaxed version of the second assumption does 
not crucially affect the results. Observe that the second assumption 
requires that a planner select the first player, then the second, and so on. 
The planner must also establish the direction of the movement (left/right). 
The lack of a planner implies that there is no (exogenous) sorting. Hence 
subjects may move themselves when they want to. 
Therefore, when subjects must make a decision to move in real life we see 
that assumption 2 fails in several domains: 
•  Subjects’ decisions are simultaneous: nobody waits for another 
subject to decide whether or not to move. 
•  At the time each subject makes his choice the actual configuration 
is exogenous, that is, the timing of the configuration is not relevant, 
only the actual configuration.   25 
Under these circumstances, subjects perceive the decision of moving – 
the game - as being simultaneous rather than sequential. The situation 
described here is very similar to what we have shown in previous figures. 
Second round configurations are formed by a number of non-symmetric 
clusters that may be representative of any actual city. For instance (Figure 
4; round 2): WWRRWRWR. 
In this case, subjects simultaneously decide whether or not to move. This 
paper provides empirical (experimental) evidence of how subjects play that 
game. They use focal points to make decisions. This is not rare given that 
any cluster of players - WW (RR) for whites (reds) - is the safest option for 
them.  
In the costly simultaneous model, subjects are less prone to move but the 
behavior is the same: subjects move to focal points or they do not expect 
others to do so. 
Finally, there is another issue (not reported in the original model but 
largely explored in the literature, see Laurie and Jaggi (2003)
xxii, among 
others): subjects might be unable to compute the full configuration of the 
city. That is, subjects may use local information only to compute the 
solutions and therefore cannot generate a map of the best response paths 
for every single player. 
In that case, the use of focal points is even truer. The subject is only able 
to see the relevant cluster (and not the complete configuration of the city) 
For instance, WWRRW…   26 
Hence, the player decides whether to move to that place or not. Obviously 
this also affects beliefs: players do not need to assume that other 
participants are able to compute all the possible pure strategies, but only 
choices over the focal points.  
In sum, this paper shows that the requirement of sequential choice, which 
is hard to believe in real life, is not a limitation for the Schelling model. This 
is true because the sequential movement with random sorting is not a 
necessary requirement to reach the equilibrium. The replication with 
positive commuting costs shows nearly identical results. 
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7. Conclusions 
Schelling's spatial proximity model (1969, 1971a) is established with a 
series of minimal requirements with regard to the subjects that form 
society: subjects look for their best interest with some slightly inflexible 
preferences (a neighbor of their same color). Nevertheless, the equilibrium 
outcome of this model is very powerful: complete segregation of society.  
The first aim of this study was to verify by means of experimental analysis 
if complete segregation takes place. The second aim was to verify if 
Schelling’s model would give the same result of absolute segregation after 
modifying one of its most important properties, namely substituting 
sequential movement for simultaneous movement. The results obtained 
are forceful. 
1.  First, we obtain that when subjects play Schelling’s sequential 
model, the result is a completely segregated society.  
2.  Secondly, when subjects play Schelling’s simultaneous model 
nothing changes and complete segregation emerges without 
difficulty.  
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the set of information that players handle 
between one environment and another is radically different - and in 
addition uncertainty arises after the movements - the result turns out to be 
the same: complete segregation of the society. 
In Schelling’s model, the movements of the individuals are ruled to satisfy 
their preferences. Individuals seek happiness and whatever others have 
done or are going to do does not intervene in their decision. This is so   28 
because of the assumption of the sequential movement, which makes 
them consider their decision as a problem of individual optimization: they 
do not need to learn anything nor do they have to signal anything for the 
future. 
In the simultaneous environment, the existence of multiple equilibria 
makes them look for a coordination system. Therefore, a code is 
established in the first round, which becomes public knowledge for all the 
individuals. The first round serves to identify the types of players; it is 
therefore a learning phase. The second round is a new refinement of 
equilibria where the selection criterion is given by a follow-up to the focal 
points that have been created in the previous stage. Once more, it is 
crucial that individuals behave rationally (a player moves if he is not 
happy) and rationality is common knowledge (all the players know that 
happy players will remain still). As a consequence, subjects reach in a 
simple manner the complete segregation in which they all are happy. 
The introduction of commuting costs affects subjects’ willingness to move: 
under the presence of moving costs they move much less. However, the 
lack of movement does not greatly affect the final configuration of the 
society. In most cases (87.5%), the complete segregated equilibrium is 
achieved. 
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a.1) FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Integration (a) versus segregation (b) with N=8 subjects 
 
Figure 2: Movements in the sequential game 
 
Figure 3: Movement of 4 and 6 in the simultaneous game 
 
 
Figure 4: Sequential game in which player 1 is unhappy and does not 
move 
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Figure 5: Neighbor Focal Points (S1, S3) 
 
 
Figure 6: Distant Focal Points (S2) 
 
 
Figure 7: Distant Focal Points (S7) 
 
 
Figure 8: Two large focal points (S6) 
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Figure 9: A large focal point and a small focal point (S5) 
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a.2) TABLES 
Group  City  Round  Movers 
Non-
movers  Happy  Unhappy 
0      0  8 
A1  Pamplona  1  1,4,7  2,3,5,6,8  8  0 
0      0  8 
A2  Pamplona  1  2,5,8  1,3,4,6  8  0 
0      0  8 
A3  Valencia  1  1,4,7  2,3,5,6,8  8  0 
0      0  8 
A4  Valencia  1  1,4,7  2,3,5,6,8  8  0 
 
Table 1: Results of the sequential games. 
 
 
Group  City  Round  Movers 
Non-
movers  Happy  Unhappy 
0      0  8 
1  7  1  4  4 
S1  Pamplona  2  4  4  8  0 
0      0  8 
1  5  3  4  4 
S2  Pamplona  2  4  4  8  0 
0      0  8 
1  4  4  4  4 
S3  Pamplona  2  3  5  8  0 
0      0  8 
S4  Pamplona  1  6  2  8  0 
0      0  8 
1  4  4  7  1 
S5  Pamplona  2  1  7  8  0 
0      0  8 
1  6  2  7  1 
S6  Valencia  2  1  7  8  0 
0      0  8 
1  7  1  4  4 
S7  Valencia  2  4  4  8  0 
0      0  8 
S8  Valencia  1  5  3  8  0 
 
Table 2: Results of the simultaneous games 
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Group  City  Round  Movers 
Non-
movers  Happy  Unhappy 
0        0  8 
1  3  5  4  4 
S1  Pamplona  2  1  7  8  0 
0        0  8 
1  2  6  7  1 
S2  Pamplona  2  1  7  8  0 
0        0  8 
1  4  4  6  2 
S3  Pamplona  2  1  7  8  0 
0        0  8 
S4  Pamplona  1  2  6  8  0 
0        0  8 
1  2  6  7  1 
S5  Pamplona  2  1  7  8  0 
0        0  8 
1  5  3  6  2 
S6  Pamplona  2  2  6  8  0 
0        0  8 
1  2  6  7  1 
S7  Pamplona  2  1  7  8  0 
0        0  8 
1  4  4  4  4  S8  Pamplona 
2  2  6  8  0 
 
Table 3: Results of the simultaneous games with costs   38 
a.3) EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The instructions given to the subjects who took part in the experiments are 
detailed below. Subjects were distributed into groups of eight for both of 
the  treatments:  a  treatment  in  which  they  played  Schelling’s  sequential 
model (Case A) and another treatment in which they played Schelling’s 
simultaneous model (Case S). The following instructions are for subjects 
wearing a red scarf in both treatments. The instructions are the same for 
subjects  with  a  white  scarf;  the  only  difference  being  the  color  that 
identifies the subject and the color of the neighbors who make the subjects 
happy. 
 
Instructions Case A: 
 
1.  Please tie the scarf around your neck. 
2.   Eight subjects will participate in the task. Four will sit in one row of 
desks and another 4 will sit in the row of desks behind them. Please 
turn around to face all your partners. 
3.   There are two types of subjects: those with a white scarf and those 
with a red one. As you already know, you are Red. 
 
How do I earn money? 
 
4.  If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color, you will earn 2 euros as follows: 
•  If both the neighbor to your right and to your left are white, then you 
will NOT earn anything. 
•  If the neighbor to your right or to your left (or on both sides) is red, 
you will earn 2 euros. 
 
5. You are allowed to move (if you want to!). You can seat yourself in the 
closest space that you wish. A space is the distance between two persons. 
You can jump as much as you wish (a place, two places, etc). You can 
only move to your right, that is, counter-clockwise. 
 
6. How can I move? To move, you have to write the place you want to 
move to on your sheet. Write your current position in blue on your sheet 
and the position where you want to move to in black. If you do not move, 
mark your current position in black. Your sheet will be picked up and then 
you will be told the new set up. 
 
Well, now we are going to play 
 
7.  We  will  now  throw  a  dice.  The  dice  will  decide  who  will  be  the  first 
person  to  move.  The  rest  of  the  players  will  then  move  in  consecutive 
order (towards the right). The first player will make his choice (not moving,   39 
moving,  jumping  one  place,  jumping  two  places,…,  jumping  6  places). 
When you are told, you will have to make your choice. Write your current 
location in blue and the position you are moving to in black on your sheet. 
If you are not moving, write your current location in black. 
 
8. We will then collect your sheet and tell you your new set up. 
 
9. If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color then you will earn 2 euros. 
 
 
Instructions Case S: 
 
 
1.  Please tie the scarf around your neck. 
2.   Eight subjects will participate in the task. Four will sit in one row of 
desks and another 4 will sit in the row of desks behind them. Please 
turn around to face all your partners. 
3.   There are two types of subjects: those with a white scarf and those 
with a red one. As you already know, you are Red. 
 
How do I earn money? 
 
4.  If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color, you earn 2 euros as follows: 
 
•  If both the neighbor to your right and to your left are white, then you 
will NOT earn anything. 
•  If the neighbor to your right or to your left (or both of them) is red, 
you will earn 2 euros. 
 
5. You are allowed to move (if you want to!). You can seat yourself in the 
closest space that you wish. A space is the distance between two persons. 
You can jump as much as you wish (a place, two places, etc). You can 
only move to your right, that is, counter-clockwise. 
 
6. How can I move? To move, you have to write the place you want to 
move to on your sheet. Write your current position in blue on your sheet 
and the position where you want to move to in black. If you do not move, 
mark your current position in black. Your sheet will be picked up and then 
you will be told the new set up. 
 
 
Well, now we are going to play   
 
7. You will now make your choice (not moving, moving, jumping one place, 
moving by jumping two places, …, moving by jumping 6 places). When   40 
you are told, you will have to make your choice. Write your current location 
in blue on your sheet and the position you are moving to in black. If you 
are not moving, write your current location in black. 
 
8. We will then collect your sheet and tell you your new set up 
 
9. If at the end of the exercise AT LEAST ONE OF YOUR NEIGHBORS is 
of your same color then you will earn 2 euros. 
 
Figure 9 shows the graph given to the subjects so that they could clearly 
identify both their position and that of the rest of the individuals in their 
group.  In  the  simultaneous  game,  every  individual  was  given  a  similar 
graph. The graph was then collected to determine the decision made by 
each subject. In the sequential game, the same graph was passed from 
one  subject  to  another,  considering  the  order  of  movement.  The  graph 
was therefore automatically updated with each subjects’ annotations.  
 
 
Figure A: Control graph for each group 
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NOTES 
                                                 
i It is interesting to bear in mind that there are many forms of segregation. 
Segregation can happen in a racial context, but it can also arise for religious 
reasons, sexual orientation, etc. 
ii Schelling calls this microeconomic model of neighborhood segregation a spatial 
proximity model. There are other variants of Schelling’s model in the literature 
both in linear and matrix form (see Young, 1998 or Zhang, 2004a, 2004b). 
iii The number of individuals can be infinite, but Schelling (1971a) refers to the 
possibility of an infinite continuous line or a circle. The advantage is that in these 
cases all the individuals have the same number of neighbors. 
iv Consequently, if we say that each individual has four neighbors, they will be the 
two on his right-hand side and the two to his left. 
v In this last frame, together with the assumption that each agent uses the 
information of the type of neighbors he has to his right and to his left, we could 
say that agents have very minimum requirements about the composition of their 
neighborhood. 
vi In a simultaneous game where all individuals choose at the same time, no one 
knows a priori the choices made by the rest of the agents. 
vii Dasgupta et al. (2008) also compares a simultaneous and sequential 
experimental game. They also use colors and subjects have to coordinate. 
However we require coordination for n=2 subjects whereas they need full 
coordination. 
viii Benito et al. (2009) provide a sequential version of Schelling’s experiment in 
two different settings: with and without moving costs. 
ix A round is defined in this work as the moment at which all the participants have 
made their choice. In the simultaneous model a round occurs when everyone has 
decided, i.e. the first round would be their first choice. In the sequential model a 
round occurs when all have chosen, that is, when the last agent who is supposed 
to choose has made his decision. 
x Even though it is not necessary, symmetry is assumed to mean that the number 
of subjects N is even and that there are N/2 subjects belonging to each type.   42 
                                                                                                                                     
xi This should be understood as a not very strict requirement of the model: 
individuals only need one neighbor equal to them in order to acquire their 
maximum utility or happiness. 
xii The decision made by the subject who starts moving is random. But starting 
from the first one, all the rest move in a consecutive way, for example towards 
the right. Whether individuals move to the right or to the left hand side is not 
relevant, what matters is that there is an order of movement and that this 
movement has to be clear. 
xiiiTo simplify the explanation, we assume that subjects 5 and 7 do not move. 
However, as we will see, in the event that they do move, none of them would 
choose to locate between subjects 2 and 8 because this position would not be a 
good strategy for them. 
xiv It is important to remember that all subjects decide to move (or not move) 
simultaneously. Therefore, when subject 6 chooses to move, he does not know 
what subject 4 is going to do. 
xv Quoting Coricelli and Nagel (2009, p. 9163): “Psychologists and philosophers 
define this as theory of mind or mentalizing, the ability to think about others’ 
thoughts and mental states to predict their intentions and actions”. 
xvi Rizzolatti, Fogassi and Gallese (2006) suggest that in primates and humans 
there are specific neuronal circuits in order to interiorize the tasks or movements 
of other human beings or members of the same species or of other species. See 
also Fogassi et al. (2005) and Gallese, Keysers and Rizzolatti (2004). 
xvii We keep enough space between subjects (2 meters) to preserve anonymity and 
communication was strictly forbidden. All the subjects were seated in front of the 
whiteboard and communication was forbidden. Two monitors were in charge of each 
session. 
xviii If all subjects were identical, any movement would generate the initial situation 
given that all subjects would make the same movement and the only result would 
be a spin with identical distribution. 
xix If two people have the same a prioris, and their posterioris for a given event 
are common knowledge, then these posterioris should also be the same. For a 
broader discussion about the concept of common knowledge in decision-making 
in games see Aumann (1976).   43 
                                                                                                                                     
xx Hence, final earnings=(2– 0.5*movements)*euros. In other words, subjects may 
spend 25% or their potential benefits if they move once, 50% if they move twice, 
and so on. 
xxi This is just an example. We should note that the small size (n=8) of our game 
is essential for achieving these results. 
xxii Laurie and Jaggi (2003) extended the Schelling model of neighborhood racial 
segregation to include agents who can authentically ‘see’ their neighbors up to a 
distance R, which they called ‘vision’. They explored how vision interacts with 
racial preferences and minority concentrations. 